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Abstract. We propose a new geometric approach for the analysis
of cooperative games. A cooperative game is viewed as a real val-
ued function u de¯ned on a ¯nite set of points in the unit simplex.
We de¯ne the concavi¯cation of u on the simplex as the minimal
concave function on the simplex which is greater than or equal to
u.
The concavi¯cation of u induces a game which is the totally
balanced cover of the game. The concavi¯cation of u is used to
characterize well-known classes of games, such as balanced, totally
balanced, exact and convex games. As a consequence of the anal-
ysis it turns out that a game is convex if and only if each one of
its sub-games is exact.
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Geometric methods have been found fruitful in the analysis of coop-
erative games. Two major directions have been taken so far. The ¯rst
is identifying a game with a vector in R2n¡1. This is done by ordering
all non-empty coalitions (S1;S2;:::;S2n¡1) and identifying the game v
with the 2n ¡1 dimensional vector, whose the i'th coordinate is v(Si).
In this case, the set of all n-players cooperative games is identi¯ed with
R2n¡1. This approach allows to use geometric and algebraic techniques
for the analyzes. It is possible to ¯nd a set of relatively simple games
that forms a basis (in the algebraic meaning) for the entire space. Such
an analysis may facilitate the analysis signi¯cantly. For instance, the
Shapley value, a solution concept which respects additivity, is deter-
mined by its behavior on the basis games.
The second geometric approach is to identify every coalition S µ N
with the indicator of S, that is with the n-vector whose i'th coordinate
equals 1 if i 2 S and 0 otherwise. In this case, every coalition corre-
sponds to an extreme point of the unit cube in Rn. Therefore, a game
is a real valued function de¯ned on the set of extreme points of the unit
cube. Since the function is de¯ned only on the set of extreme points,
it is natural to consider an extension of the domain to the entire cube.
A natural way of doing so is the multi-linear extension (Owen, 1972).
In this paper we propose a new geometric interpretation of a co-
operative game. Every coalition S is identi¯ed with a point in the
n-dimensional unit simplex. The coalition S is identi¯ed with the vec-
tor CS =
IS
jSj where IS is the indicator of S. Thus, the coalition is
identi¯ed with the uniform distribution over the members of S. A
game v is converted to a function u de¯ned over the points CS;S µ N.
The value that the function u is assumes at the point CS is the average
of the worth of S, that is u(CS) =
v(S)
jSj .
Given such a function u, we consider the concavi¯cation of u, de-
noted cavu, which is a function de¯ned on the entire simplex. The
1concavi¯cation of a function u is de¯ned as the minimum of all con-
cave functions that are greater than or equal to u. Since the minimum
of a family of concave functions is concave, cavu is the minimal concave
function which is greater than or equal to u.
The following argument might give the intuition for the reason why
considering cavu is bene¯cial. One of the most intuitive solution con-
cepts of a cooperative game is the core, de¯ned by core(v) = fx 2
Rn;
Pn
i=1 xi = v(N);
P
i2S xi ¸ v(S);S µ Ng. Let x be a particular
vector in core(v) and de¯ne the function1 fx(q) = xq for q 2 ¢. fx
is a linear function on ¢ and therefore concave. Since x 2 core(v) it
follows that fx(CS) ¸ u(CS) for every coalition S, with equality for
S = N. Thus, since cavu is the minimal concave function which is
greater than or equal to u, fx ¸ cavu on ¢ and fx(CN) = cavu(CN).
In other words, fx is a linear support for cavu at the point CN. This
argument suggests that there is a correspondence between core vectors
of the game v and linear supports of cavu at CN.
The paper contains results of three kinds. All demonstrate relations
between certain properties of the game v and the structure of the func-
tions u and cavu. The ¯rst kind of results deals with the core of v and
its sub-games. It turns out that v has a non-empty core if and only if
cavu and u coincide on the center of the simplex, CN. Moreover, the
core of every sub-game of v is non-empty if and only if cavu and u
coincide on all the points CS;S µ N:
The second kind of results refers to exact games. Exact games
(Schmeidler, 1972) are characterized in terms of the concavi¯cation
of u. Furthermore, a condition similar to that of Shapley-Bondareva
(see Shapley, 1967 and Bondareva, 1962) theorem that characterizes
exact games is provided.
The third kind of results refers to convex games (Shapley, 1971). It
turns out that a game is convex if and only if each one of its sub-games
1xq denotes the inner product of x and q
2is exact. In addition a convex game is characterized by a property of
its concavi¯cation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we formally introduce
the function u and its concavi¯cation. Section 3 is devoted to the core
and Section 4 to exact games. The paper ends with Section 5 where
convex games are discussed.
2. Concavification of a cooperative game
Let v be a cooperative game with N being the set of players, jNj = n.
We denote by ¢ the unit simplex of I R
n, that is ¢ = f(q1;q2;:::;qn);
Pn
i=1 qi = 1;qi ¸ 0;i = 1;2;:::;ng. For any non-empty coalition
R µ N and a player i 2 N de¯ne Ci
R to be 1
jRj if i 2 R and 0 otherwise.
Denote CR = (C1
R;:::;Cn
R). Notice that CR is in ¢ for every R.
For any non-empty coalition R de¯ne u(CR) =
v(R)
jRj . u is a function
over a set of 2n ¡ 1 points in the n dimensional simplex. u(CR) is the
average of the worth of coalition R.
De¯nition 1. The concavi¯cation of u, denoted cavu, is de¯ned as the
minimum of all concave functions f : ¢ ! I R such that f(CR) ¸ u(CR)
for every non-empty coalition R.
Remark 1. Since the minimum of a family of concave functions over
¢ is concave, cavu is concave. Thus, cavu is the minimal concave
function that is greater than or equal to u on every point of the type
CR.















RµN ®RCR = q; ®R ¸
0 and
P
RµN ®R = 1
ª
: Since w is concave and w ¸ u, cavu · w. On
the other hand, if
P
RµN ®RCR = q where ®R ¸ 0 and
P
RµN ®R = 1;





Thus, cavu ¸ w.
33. Convcavification and the core
We will use the following standard de¯nition:
De¯nition 2. For a function f : ¢ ! R and a point p 2 ¢, a vector
x 2 I R
n is a linear support for f at p, if xp = f(p) and xq ¸ f(q) for
any q 2 ¢.
The following proposition provides a simple characterization of games
with non-empty core.
Proposition 1. v has a non-empty core i® cavu(Cn) = u(Cn):
Proof. Assume ¯rst that v has a non-empty core and let x 2 core(v).
Consider the linear (and in particular concave) function on ¢ de¯ned
by f(q) = xq. Since x is in the core, for every non-empty coalition




jRj = u(CR). It follows that
f(q) ¸ cavu(q) for every q 2 ¢. By a similar argument, f(CN) =
xCn = u(CN). Therefore, u(CN) · cavu(CN) · xCN = u(CN), so
u(CN) = cavu(CN).
In the other direction, assume that cavu(Cn) = u(Cn). Since cavu
is concave it has a linear support at the point CN, call it x. By
assumption, xCN = cavu(CN) = u(CN). Also, for every R µ N,
x(R)
jRj = xCR ¸ u(CR) =
v(R)
jRj , so x(R) ¸ v(R). Therefore, x 2 core(v).
Remark 2. Shapley-Bondareva Theorem asserts that v has a non-
empty core i® the equation
X
R
®RCR = CN; (1)
where ®R ¸ 0 and
P
R ®R = 1 implies
X
R
®Ru(CR) · u(CN): (2)
The non-trivial part of this statement is the "if" direction, which
turns out to be a simple consequence of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
Indeed, due to Lemma 1 and the fact that equation (1) implies equation
4(2), cavu(CN) · u(CN). Thus, cavu(CN) = u(CN) and by Proposition
1, the core of v is not empty.
Corollary 1. Assume that v has a non-empty core. Then,
(a) x is in the core of v i® x is a linear support of cavu at CN.











(iii) ®` > 0 for every ` = 1;:::;k; and
(iv) CR2 ¡ CR1;:::;CRk ¡ CR1 are linearly independent
o
:
Proof. (a) Follows from the proof of Proposition 1.
(b) The dimension of the set of supports at a certain point is the
dimension of the domain (here, ¢, whose dimension is n ¡ 1) minus
the dimension of the facet of the graph of cavu that contains this point
in its relative interior. The dimension of this facet at CN is d ¡ 1 and
therefore the dimension of the set of supports at this point, which is
the core, is n ¡ 1 ¡ (d ¡ 1) = n ¡ d.
Proposition 1 reveals the relation between non-emptiness of the core
and the concavi¯cation of u. It seems natural at this point to ask
whether the same relation holds for the sub-games of v. We denote by
vR the sub-game of v where the set of players is restricted to R. The
following Lemma asserts that the previous result holds for sub-games
as well.
Lemma 2. For any coalition R, the core of vR is non-empty i® cavu(CR) =
u(CR).
Proof. Fix some coalition R. Denote by ¢R the vectors in ¢ that vanish
outside of R (i.e., the vectors whose support is R). cavu restricted
to ¢R is a concave function. Assume that cavu coincides with u on
5CR. Since CR is in the relative interior of ¢R it has a linear support
xR 2 I R
n, whose coordinates out of R vanish. By the argument of
Proposition 1 the vector xR, restricted to R, is in the core of vR.
Conversely, suppose that xR = (xi
R)i2R is in the core of vR. De¯ne
yR = (yi
R)i2N 2 I R




R = M, where M is a large number to be determined later. Note,
that if T µ R, then yRCT = xRCT. Since xR is in the core of vR,




jTj = u(CT), with equality
when T = R. If M is large enough, then yRCS ¸
v(S)
jSj = u(CS) for
every S. Therefore, yR de¯nes a linear function (in particular, concave)
over ¢ which attains the value u(CR) on CR and values which are
greater than or equal to u(CS) on CS, for other coalitions S. It follows
that cavu(CR) · yRCR. Since, cavu(CR) ¸ u(CR) = yRCR we have
cavu(CR) = u(CR) as needed.
Corollary 2. v is a market game i® cavu = u.
Proof. It is well known (see Shapley and Shubik ,1969 ) that v is a
market game i® the core of every sub-game of v is not empty. By
Lemma 2 it is equivalent to cavu = u.
Remark 3. For every game v, the corresponding cavu induces a game
¹ v de¯ned as follows. For every coalition R, ¹ v(R) = jRjcavu(CR). By
Corollary 2, ¹ v is a market game. This is the smallest market game
which is greater than v itself. ¹ v is the totally-balanced-cover of the
game v.
Remark 4. Kalai and Zemel (1982) assert that a market game is a
minimum of ¯nitely many linear functions. Indeed, if v is a market
game, then cavu = u, as Corollary 2 states. Thus, cavu is the mini-
mum of its supports at the points of the sort CR. Since there are ¯nitely
many of those, the assertion follows.
64. Convcavification and exact games
De¯nition 3. (Schmeidler, 1972) The game v is exact if for every
coalition R there is x in the core of v such that v(R) = x(R).
Proposition 2. The following are equivalent
(a) v is exact.
(b) u is the minimum of a family of linear functions ff`g` over ¢ such




®RCR = ¯CT + (1 ¡ ¯)CN; (3)
where ®R ¸ 0,
P
R ®R = 1, T is a coalition and ¯ 2 [0;1], implies
X
R
®Ru(CR) · ¯u(CT) + (1 ¡ ¯)u(CN): (4)
Proof. To show that (a) implies (b) assume that v is exact. For every





for every S, with equality for S = R;N. De¯ne fR(q) = xRq, and let
w(q) = minRffR(q)g. It is not hard to see that w(CR) = u(CR) for
every coalition R, so (b) follows.
Next, assume that (b) holds. Then for every R there is a linear
function fR such that fR ¸ u and fR(q) = u(q); q = CR;CN. Denote
the segment connecting the points (CR;u(CR)) and (CN;u(CN)) by L.
L is on the graph of fR. Since cavu is concave, L is below the graph
of cavu. As cavu · fR, L is above the graph of cavu. Thus, L is
on the graph of cavu. In particular, ¯cavu(CR)+(1¡¯)cavu(CN) =
¯u(CR) + (1 ¡ ¯)u(CN) for every ¯ 2 [0;1].
Now, assume that equation (3) holds. Due to concavity of cavu,
P




R ®Rcavu(CR) · ¯u(CT) + (1 ¡ ¯)u(CN), which proves (c).
Finally, assume (c). Lemma 1 and (c) imply that cavu(¯CR + (1 ¡
¯)CN) · ¯u(CR)+(1¡¯)u(CN). Concavity and the fact that cavu ¸ u
7imply that
cavu(¯CR + (1 ¡ ¯)CN) = ¯u(CR) + (1 ¡ ¯)u(CN):
Thus, L is on the graph of cavu. Therefore, there is x which is a
linear support of cavu at both, CN and CR. By corollary 1 x 2 core(v)
and since it is a linear support at CR; x(R) = v(R). This proves that
v is exact.
Remark 5. Note the similarity between the condition of Shapley-Bondareva
Theorem (i.e., (1) implies (2) { see Remark 2) and Proposition 2 (c)
(i.e., (3) implies (4)).
5. Convcavification and convex games
De¯nition 4. (Shapley 1971) The game v is convex if for any two
coalitions S and T, v(S) + v(T) · v(S \ T) + v(S [ T).
Notation 1. (a) For a permutation ¼ over N, denote by Ri
¼ the coali-
tion f¼(1);¼(2);:::;¼(i)g, i = 1;:::;n.
(b) Let v be a game and ¼ an order over the set of players N. Then the






¼ );i 2 N.
(c) Let q = (q1;:::;qn) 2 ¢. ¼q denotes a permutation of the players
such that q¼q(1) ¸ q¼q(2) ¸ ::: ¸ q¼q(n). When there is more than one
such permutations, i.e., qi = qj for some i 6= j, ¼q is any one of them.
(d) For q = (q1;:::;qn) 2 ¢, let Ri
q = Ri
¼q and xq = x¼q:
Remark 6. The assertion that v is convex implies that v is exact is
well known. It follows from the fact that in a convex game the vector
of marginal contributions, with respect to an order ¼, x¼, is in the core
of v. Thus, if according to ¼ the players of R are ordered ¯rst and then
all the rest, x¼(R) = v(R). Thus, v is exact.
The next proposition relates convex games to the structure of the func-
tion u.
8Proposition 3. The following are equivalent
(a) v is convex.




®RCR = ¯CT + (1 ¡ ¯)CS;
where ®R ¸ 0,
P




®Ru(CR) · ¯u(CT) + (1 ¡ ¯)u(CS):
Proof. The fact that (a) and (c) of Proposition 2 are equivalent implies
that (b) and (c) are equivalent.


















equivalent to v(S) + v(T) · v(S \ T) + v(S [ T). Thus, v is convex.
If v is convex, then every vR is convex, and therefore, by Remark 6,
every vR is exact. Thus, (a) implies (b).
Remark 7. Proposition 2 (c) and Lemma 1 imply that when v is ex-
act and q is on the segment connecting CN and CR (for some coalition
R), cavu(q) is equal to corresponding weighted average of u(CN) and
u(CR). Proposition 3 (c) asserts that, when v is convex, this prop-
erty holds also for other coalitions than the grand one: if q is on the
segment connecting CS and CT and T µ S, then cavu(q) is equal to
corresponding weighted average of u(CS) and u(CT):
We conclude with two propositions which provide di®erent charac-
terizations of convex games. The ¯rst one uses cavu to describe the
set of convex games, while the second asserts that a game is convex if
and only if u has a certain consistency property. However, both these
propositions heavily relies on the fact that in a convex game the vector
of marginal contributions of the players (for any order) is in the core.
For the next proposition recall Notation 1 (d).
9Proposition 4. v is convex if and only if for every q 2 ¢,
cavu(q) = qxq:
Proof. Assume ¯rst that v is convex, and ¯x some q 2 ¢. Without loss
of generality we may assume that q1 ¸ q2 ¸ ::: ¸ qn, so ¼ = ¼q is the
identity, and Ri = Ri
q = f1;2;:::;ig. Since v is convex, xq 2 core(v).
Thus, by Corollary 1 (a), xq is a linear support of cavu at the point
CN. In particular, qxq ¸ cavu(q).
For k = 1;:::;n de¯ne ®k = k(qk ¡ qk+1) (with the convention that
qn+1 = 0). Notice that ® 2 ¢. Indeed, ®k ¸ 0 for every k since




k=1 k(qk ¡qk+1) =
Pn
k=1 qk = 1. Consider
the convex combination
Pn















(qk ¡ qk+1) = qj
It follows that
Pn
























Thus, cavu(q) ¸ qxq and therefore cavu(q) = qxq, as required.
As for the inverse direction, assume that for every q 2 ¢, cavu(q) =
qxq. We will use Proposition 3 to show that v is convex. Let T µ S be
two coalitions, 0 · ¯ · 1, and denote q = ¯CT + (1 ¡ ¯)CS. Assume
that the equation
P
R ®RCR = q holds with ®R ¸ 0 and
P
R ®R = 1.
By Lemma 1,
P
R ®Ru(CR) · cavu(q).








jSj i 2 T
1¡¯
jSj i 2 S n T
0 i = 2 S
10Consider the permutation of q according to ¼q. The ¯rst jTj coordinates




jSj , the next jSj ¡ jTj coordinates will
equal
1¡¯
jSj , and the last n ¡ jSj will equal 0. Moreover, R
jTj
q = T, and
R
jSj























































+ (1 ¡ ¯)
v(S)
jSj
= ¯u(CT) + (1 ¡ ¯)u(CS):
Therefore,
P
R ®Ru(CR) · cavu(q) = ¯u(CT) + (1 ¡ ¯)u(CS). By
Proposition 3 v is convex.
Proposition 4 states that when a game is convex, cavu(q) is the
weighted average (according to q) of the marginal contributions of the
players when ordered according to the order of the coordinates of q.
Proposition 5. v is convex i® there is a family ff`g` of linear functions
such that whenever R µ S, u(CR) = minff`(CR); f`(CS) = u(CS)g:
Proof. If the above condition holds, then due to Proposition 2 (b), v
and each of its sub-games are exact. Therefore, by Proposition 3, v is
convex.
To show the converse, assume that v is convex. Consider an order
¼ of the set of players and the vector of marginal contributions with
respect to ¼, x¼. Let f¼(q) = x¼q. We show that the collection of linear
functions ff¼g over all permutations ¼ satis¯es the above condition.
First, since x¼ is in the core of v for every ¼, we have for every R,
f¼(CR) = x¼CR ¸
v(R)
jRj = u(CR). In particular, u(CR) · minff¼(CR);
f¼(CS) = u(CS)g for every R µ S.
11For two particular coalitions R µ S choose any order ¼ with the
property that the ¯rst jRj players in ¼ are the coalition R and the
¯rst jSj players are the coalition S. Then obviously, u(CR) = f¼(CR)
and u(CS) = f¼(CS). It follows that u(CR) ¸ minff¼(CR); f¼(CS) =
u(CS)g and the proposition follows.
Proposition 5 is a kind of consistency property. Consider the set
N as the set of states and v as a non-additive probability over N.
Suppose that non-additive probability (Schmeidler, 1989) v is obtained
by taking the minimum over a set of additive probabilities (see Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989). v is convex if this set of additive probabilities
owes the following property.
Upon receiving the information that the event R occurred, the non-
additive probability is updated and becomes vR. However, vR itself is
also obtained as a minimum of additive probabilities: of those according
to which the probability of S is precisely v(S).
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